

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Andres Leroy Glenn,)	C/A No.: 3:13-1410-CMC-SVH
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
)	
Marvin Glover, Bernade Jones, and)	
Kesha Willaimson,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

Plaintiff Andres Leroy Glenn, proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis*, alleges that Defendants have stolen his money and property. [Entry #1 at 2; Entry #1-3]. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the district judge dismiss the complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Marvin Glover (“Glover”) has stolen money from him “a little at a time.” [Entry #1 at 2]. Plaintiff’s pleading requested \$1000 in monetary damages. *Id.* Plaintiff failed to fully complete, or sign the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned issued an order on May 28, 2013, allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to bring this case into proper form within a specified time period. [Entry #7]. In response to the order, Plaintiff submitted a signed statement of claim alleging that: (1)

Bernade Jones (“Jones”) is in possession of Plaintiff’s land and money; (2) Marvin Glover has taken money from Plaintiff; and (3) Kesha Willaimson (“Willaimson”) took money from Plaintiff in 2012. [Entry #1-3]. Plaintiff seeks return of his money and property. *Id.* The undersigned notes that Plaintiff has previously filed complaints in this court against Jones for alleged possession of Plaintiff’s real estate and against Willaimson for alleged possession of Plaintiff’s money. *See Glenn v. Grifith, et al.*, C/A No. 3:13-1195-CMC (D.S.C. May 1, 2013); *Glenn v. Jones, et al.*, C/A No. 3:12-2682-CMC (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 2012); *Glenn v. Jones, et al.*, C/A No. 3:12-1521-CMC (D.S.C. June 7, 2012). The court dismissed each of Plaintiff’s prior cases without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed *sua sponte* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of N.Y.*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Analysis

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” *In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc.*, 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, *sua sponte*, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” *Id.* at 352; *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the

outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. *Lovern v. Edwards*, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).

There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, *Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, MD.*, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. *McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.*, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); *see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.*, 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction[.]” When a complaint fails to include “an affirmative pleading of a jurisdictional basis, the federal court may find that it has jurisdiction if the facts supporting jurisdiction have been clearly pleaded.” *Pinkley*, 191 F.3d at 399 (citation omitted). However, if the court, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to a plaintiff, finds insufficient allegations in the pleadings, the court will lack subject matter jurisdiction. *Id*; *see also Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc.*, 669 F.3d 448, 452–53 (4th Cir. 2012) (when the alleged federal claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy,” then subject matter jurisdiction does not exist) (citation omitted).

The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As discussed below, the allegations contained

in the instant complaint do not fall within the scope of either form of this court's limited jurisdiction.

First, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of \$75,000. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. *See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger*, 437 U.S. 365, 372–74 nn. 13–16 (1978). The court has no diversity jurisdiction over this case because, according to Plaintiff's pleadings, complete diversity is lacking and the amount in controversy does not meet the requirement of § 1332(a). [Entry #1 at 2; Entry #11].


Second, the essential allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient to show that the case is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff's allegations do not assert that the defendants have violated a federal statute or constitutional provision, nor is any type of federal question jurisdiction otherwise evident from the face of the pleading. Instead, the complaint alleges claims associated with a dispute over money or real estate, which are matters of state law to be heard in the state courts, unless diversity of citizenship is present. *Cf. Killingsworth v. Truluck*, C/A No. 0:10-1823-TLW-PJG, 2010 WL 4638763, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2010) (ownership of personal property a matter of state law); *see also Faulkenberry v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.*, 563 S.E.2d 644 (S.C. 2002) (property dispute).

Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts establishing that the court has jurisdiction over this matter, the undersigned recommends it be summarily dismissed.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.



July 1, 2013
Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge

**The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
“Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”**

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).